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Parental Failure to Provide Child with
Medical Assistance Based on Religious
Beliefs Causing Child's Death
Involuntary Manslaughter in Pennsylvania
In my belief I know no other way but the way I pointed out
to live and if I would go to a doctor I would be turning my
back on my faith.'
I. Introduction
Justin Barnhart died of cancer 2 at the age of two years and
seven months. Justin's sudden and mysterious death sparked an in-
vestigation. The investigation revealed that Justin's parents, William
and Linda Barnhart, life-long members of the Faith Tabernacle
Church,' had relied on God to the exclusion of modern medicine to
cure Justin's cancer. Based on their failure to seek medical treat-
ment for their child, the Barnharts were convicted by a jury on
counts of involuntary manslaughter4 and endangering the welfare of
a child6 in the Pennsylvania Court of Common Pleas of Cambria
County.
In Commonwealth v. Barnhart,6 the Pennsylvania Superior
Court affirmed the Barnharts' convictions for involuntary man-
slaughter.7 Extensive research has failed to uncover any other appel-
late court decisions in the United States upholding such a conviction.
Thus, as a result of the Barnhart decision, it appears as though the
I. Commonwealth v. Barnhart, 345 Pa. Super. 10, 497 A.2d 616, 623 (1985) (testi-
mony of defendant William G. Barnhart).
2. Dr. Sidney A. Goldblatt testified at the trial for the death of Justin Barnhart that
the cause of Justin Barnhart's death was a "Wilms tumor, also known as nephroblastoma, a
tumor originating in the left kidney and metastasizing to the right and left lungs and to the
lymph nodes, mediastinal and para-aortic area." Id. at 26-27, 497 A.2d at 621.
3. A central tenet of this faith is that life rests ultimately in God's hands. d.at 20,
497 A.2d at 621.
4. 18 PA. CONST. STAT.. § 2504(a) (1982). For the text of Section 2504, see infra note
120.
5. 18 PA. CONST. STAT. § 4304 (1982). For the text of Section 4304, see infra note
125.
6. 345 Pa. Super. 10, 497 A.2d 616 (1985).
7. The convictions for endangering the welfare of a child merged with the convictions
for involuntary manslaughter for purposes of sentencing. Id. at 36, 497 A.2d at 630.
Superior Court is the first appellate court in the United States to
affirm a parent's conviction for involuntary manslaughter, when the
parent has caused a child's death by failing to provide medical assis-
tance because of conscientious religious objections.
This decision directly penalized the Barnharts in the exercise of
their religious beliefs thus raising questions of grave constitutional
importance. This comment first examines the general scope and limi-
tations of the free exercise clause of the first amendment to the
United States Constitution8 as defined and interpreted by the United
States Supreme Court. Second, it examines the states' power under
the doctrine of parens patriae to limit and intrude on parental au-
tonomy in the area of medical decision-making for children. The
comment then focuses on the disposition of the issue presented in the
Barnhart decision in jurisdictions other than Pennsylvania. Finally,
this comment traces the development of this controversial area of
law in Pennsylvania and suggests an alternative to imposing criminal
liability in these situations.
II. Scope and Limitations of the Free Exercise Clause.
In the Barnhart decision, the Barnharts claimed that their con-
duct was protected by the free exercise clause of the first amend-
ment. In order to examine the viability of this claim, it is necessary
to understand the basic scope and content of the free exercise clause.
This is not a simple task. The free exercise clause has been the sub-
ject of ongoing controversy as the United States Supreme Court has
struggled to give the clause a workable content in light of the promi-
nent social concerns inherent in defining the clause. The Court's de-
cisions are not totally consistent, and they have often met with criti-
cism. For purposes of this comment, however, a review of the Court's
major decisions interpreting the clause will afford the background
necessary to examine the issue presented in the Barnhart decision,
namely, whether a parent's failure, for religious reasons, to seek
medical treatment for a child is protected by the free exercise clause
of the first amendment.
A. Decisions in Reynolds, Cantwell and Prince
Reynolds v. United States9 was the Supreme Court's first major
decision interpreting the free exercise clause. The Court was forced
to determine whether the free exercise clause could be invoked to
protect religiously-motivated conduct that was otherwise criminal.
8. "Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting
the free exercise thereof .... U.S. CONST. amend. I.
9. 98 U.S. 145 (1878).
George Reynolds was a member of the Mormon Church. In accor-
dance with the doctrines of that faith, he married a second woman
while married to his first wife."° Consequently, he was indicted for
bigamy, a federal offense." As a defense to his prosecution, Reyn-
olds claimed that his conduct was protected by the free exercise
clause. In rejecting this theory, the Court examined the history of
the first amendment and interpreted the clause as affording a very
narrow scope of protection. Relying heavily on the writings of
Thomas Jefferson,' the Court concluded that the free exercise
clause protected only religious beliefs, and not actions motivated by
those beliefs. In the Court's view, if religiously motivated actions
were protected, every man could become a law unto himself.'3
The belief-action dichotomy of Reynolds survived until the
Court's decision in Cantwell v. Connecticut."' In Cantwell, the Reyn-
olds implication that conduct was wholly outside the first amend-
ment was abandoned. The case involved the prosecution of members
of the Jehovah's Witness religious group who had gone door to door
soliciting contributions in return for books and pamphlets containing
religious material.' 6 This conduct had been found to violate a state
statute 6 which prohibited the solicitation of money for any alleged
10. One of the doctrines espoused by the Mormon Church in the nineteenth century
was the duty of male members to practice polygamy if possible. The punishment for those
members who either failed or refused to practice polygamy was damnation in the life to come.
Id. at 161.. 11. Act of Mar. 22, 1882, ch. 47, § 1, 22 Stat. 30 (1882) provided that bigamous
conduct was punishable by a fine of not more than five hundred dollars and by imprisonment
for a term of not more than five years.
12. One commentator suggests that the Court may have been unjustified in limiting the
scope of the free exercise clause by relying strictly on the views of Thomas Jefferson, as op-
posed to the views of James Madison, who also played a substantial role in the creation of the
first amendment. Madison's views were much more liberal than the views of Jefferson, as
Madison believed that actions should also be protected under the free exercise clause. See
Pepper, Reynolds, Yoder, and Beyond: Alternatives for the Free Exercise Clause, 1981 UTAH
L. REV. 309, 319-22,
13. The Court expressed its opinion that religiously motivated action could not be pro-
tected as follows:
Laws are made for the government of actions, and while they cannot interfere
with mere religious beliefs and opinions, they may with practices ....
.. . Can a man excuse his practices to the contrary because of his religious
belief? To permit this would be to make the professed doctrines of religious be-
lief superior to the law of the land, and in effect to permit every citizen to be-
come a law unto himself.
98 U.S. at 166-67.
14. 310 U.S. 296 (1940).
15. The appellants, on the day of their arrest, were engaged in going from house to
house equipped with a bag containing books and pamphlets, a phonograph, and a set of records
which described the books and pamphlets. The appellants would ask the person who answered
if they could play a record. If permission was granted, they would then request the person to
buy a book. If permission was refused, they would ask for a contribution towards publication
of the pamphlets. If a contribution was given, the appellants would give the person a pamphlet.
Id. at 301.
16. The court ruled for the first time that the free exercise clause of the first amend-
ment also applied to the states through the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment.
religious purpose unless approved by a state official.
Although the decision was partially grounded on freedom of
speech terms, 17 the Court for the first time recognized that the free
exercise clause also protects actions, albeit not absolutely. The
Court addressed the power of the states to regulate conduct which is
constitutionally protected: "In every case the power to regulate must
be so exercised as not, in attaining a permissible end, to unduly in-
fringe the protected freedom."1 9 The Court held that the statute as
applied to the Jehovah's Witnesses was a prior restraint on the exer-
cise of religion.
The decision in Cantwell indicated that the Court was willing to
protect religiously motivated actions when a state regulation "unduly
infringed" on those actions. The point at which a state statute "un-
duly infringed," however, was unclear. In Prince v. Massachusetts,"
which dealt with another controversy involving the Jehovah's Wit-
nesses, the Court followed the rationale of the Cantwell decision. Al-
though the Cantwell standard was not clarified, the Court in Prince
offered guidance as to when a state regulation did not infringe on
protected conduct.
Mrs. Prince, a member of the Jehovah's Witnesses, had been
convicted of violating child labor laws. She and her niece had been
engaged in distributing publications of the Jehovah's Witnesses on
public streets. They both believed it was their religious duty to per-
form this work. Mrs. Prince rested her defense squarely on freedom
of religion, and, in the alternative, on her parental right" to raise
her child. The Court recognized that accommodating the interests
22
involved in the case was delicate work, but it concluded that the
state's action was justified because of the substantial threats to soci-
ety that would result if children were permitted to work. The Court
Id. at 303.
17. The court throughout the opinion used "prior restraint" terminology which is tradi-
tionally a free speech criterion. Therefore it appears the decision was based on a consideration
of both the rights of free exercise and free speech. See Bantom Books, Inc., v. Sullivan, 372
U.S. 58 (1963) (discussing prior restraint criteria).
18. The Court discussed the purpose of the free exercise clause:
On the one hand, it forestalls compulsion by law of the acceptance of any creed
or the practice of any form of worship. Freedom of conscience and freedom to
adhere to such religious organization or form of worship as the individual may
choose cannot be restricted by law. On the other hand, it safeguards the free
exercise of the chosen form of religion. Thus the amendment embraces two con-
cepts, - freedom to believe and freedom to act.
310 U.S. at 303.
19. Id. at 304.
20. 321 U.S. 158 (1944).
21. See infra note 53 and accompanying text. Mrs. Prince was the child's guardian.
22. The interests involved were the parent's interests in "freedom of conscience and
religious practice," together with the "parent's claim to authority in her own household and in
the rearing of children" and the state's interest in "protecting the welfare of children." Id. at
165.
addressed the effect of the defense of parental right when coupled
with religious rights on the states' authority to regulate as follows:
But the family itself is not beyond regulation in the public inter-
est, as against a claim of religious liberty. And neither rights of
religion nor rights of parenthood are beyond limitation. Acting
to guard the general interest in youth's well being, the state as
parens patriae may restrict the parent's control by requiring
school attendance, regulating or prohibiting the child's labor and
in many other ways. Its authority is not nullified merely because
the parent grounds his claim to control the child's course of con-
duct on religion or conscience. Thus, he cannot claim freedom
from compulsory vaccination for the child more than for himself
on religious grounds. The right to practice religion freely does
not include liberty to expose the community or the child to com-
municable disease or the latter to ill health or death.'8
If the Court had stopped here with its interpretation of the
scope of protection afforded by the free exercise clause, the court in
Barnhart would have had no difficulty in affirming the Barnharts'
convictions. Although the Court in Cantwell had expanded the scope
of protection initially thought to exist in the Reynolds decision, the
decision in Prince clearly indicated that the Barnharts' conduct was
not protected by the free exercise clause. The Court did not retain
the standard announced in Cantwell and applied in Prince, however,
but further expanded the scope of protection afforded by the free
exercise clause.
B. Decisions in Sherbert, Yoder and Lee
In Sherbert v. Verner,24 the Court established an abrupt change
in the scope of protection to be afforded by the free exercise clause.
The conflict in Sherbert arose between the appellant, a member of
the Seventh-day Adventist Church, and the State of South Caro-
lina.25 The state had refused appellant's claims for unemployment
compensation benefits after she was fired from her job for refusing to
work on Saturday, the Sabbath Day of her faith. The state had de-
nied her claim because of her failure "to accept suitable work when
offered."'' 2 Although the court recognized that the burden placed on
the appellant's free exercise of religion was indirect, the Court for
23. Id. at 166-67 (citations and footnotes omitted).
24. 374 U.S. 398 (1963).
25. Id. at 399-401.
26. Id. After appellant lost her job, she was unable to find other employment because
she refused to work on Saturday. The state was of the opinion that her refusal to accept work
because of her religious convictions was not "good cause" as required under the statute. Id. at
401.
the first time required the state to show a "compelling state interest
in the regulation of a subject within the State's constitutional power
to regulate . . . .- The Court thus placed protection under the free
exercise clause on an even keel with other first amendment free-
doms.28 The state's fear of fraudulent claims by unscrupulous claim-
ants was quickly disposed of by the Court, for the state had offered
no proof warranting such fear. Furthermore, the state had not
demonstrated that there were no less restrictive alternative means to
regulate unemployment compensation benefits.2
The shift in free exercise doctrine in Sherbert was confirmed in
Wisconsin v. Yoder,8" arguably the Court's most expansive reading
of the protection afforded by the free exercise clause. In Yoder,
members of the Amish faith 1 had been convicted of violating Wis-
consin's compulsory school attendance law3 2 for declining to send
their children to public or private school after the children had grad-
uated from eighth grade. The Amish parents feared that the worldly
concerns of higher schooling would take their children away from
the simple, God-fearing, agricultural life to which the Amish ad-
27. Id. at 403 (quoting from NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415, 438 (1963)).
28. When presented with an assertion that a state regulation had invaded other first
amendment freedoms, such as freedom of speech or press, the Court often required a state to
show a compelling interest in order to justify the alleged infringement. In N.A.A.C.P. v. But-
ton. 371 U.S. 415 (1963), the Court rearticulated its position in cases involving an alleged
infringement on first amendment rights other than freedom of religion:
'In the domain of these indispensable liberties, whether of speech, press, or asso-
ciation, the decisions of this Court recognized that abridgement of such rights,
even though unintended, may inevitably follow from varied forms of governmen-
tal action.' Later . . ., we said, '[W]here there is a significant encroachment
upon personal liberty, the State may prevail only upon showing a subordinating
interest which is compelling.'
371 U.S. at 439 (citations omitted) (quoting from N.A.A.C.P. v. Alabama, 357 U.S. 449, 461
(1958) and Bates v. Little Rock, 361 U.S. 516, 524 (1960)). Thus, by requiring the state to
show a compelling interest in the Sherbert decision, the Court elevated the right to free exer-
cise of religion to a position where it is given as much protection as other first amendment
freedoms. For a review of the "compelling interest" test, see Note, Of Interests, Fundamental
and Compelling: The Emerging Constitutional Balance, 57 B.U.L. REV. 462 (1977).
29. 374 U.S. at 407. The Court noted that even if the state's fears of spurious claims
diluting the unemployment compensation fund were true, the state would have the burden of
demonstrating that no alternative forms of regulation would combat such abuses without in-
fringing on first amendment rights. Because the state had not met this burden, the law was
held to be unconstitutional as applied to appellant. Cf. Shelton v. Tucker, 364 U.S. 479, 487-
90 (1960) (explaining less restrictive alternative means requirement).
30. 406 U.S. 205 (1972).
31. Two sects were involved, the Old Order Amish Religion and the Conservative
Amish Mennonite Church. The Amish faith is characterized by their belief in a simple way of
life, with the church community separate and apart from the world and worldly influence.
They are devoted to a life in harmony with nature and the soil, and a requirement of their
faith is that they make their living by farming, or farm related activity. Formal education
beyond the eighth grade is contrary to Amish beliefs, because these are the formative years for
Amish adolescents, the period when Amish attitudes are most likely to be instilled in them. Id.
at 210-12.
32. WIs. STAT. ANN. § 118.15 (West 1969) provided in pertinent part that all children
were required to attend public or private school until such child reached the age of sixteen.
here.33 The state claimed that its interest in compulsory education
was of sufficient magnitude to override the impingement on the par-
ents' free exercise of religion.3 The Court recognized that
"[p]roviding public schools rank[ed] at the very apex of the function
of the state." 85 This strong interest in universal education, however,
was not "totally free from a balancing process when it impinge[d] on
fundamental rights and interests, such as those specifically protected
by the Free Exercise Clause of the First Amendment . . .. 6
The Court then engaged in a peculiar balancing of the religious
claim against the state's interest in compulsory education. Previ-
ously, under Sherbert, the court required only a showing of a burden
on religion. Once the burden was established, the Court did not en-
gage in an examination of the harm to the person asserting the reli-
gious claim. The Court required the state to demonstrate a compel-
ling interest. If the state failed in this attempt, that was the end of
the inquiry.31 In Yoder, however, the Court balanced the competing
interests involved.' 8 Upon weighing the interest of the Amish, the
Court found that "enforcement of the State's requirement of com-
pulsory formal education after the eighth grade would gravely en-
danger if not destroy the free exercise of. . .[the Amish] beliefs."'
Since the Amish had met the burden of demonstrating the adequacy
of their alternative mode of continuing informal vocational education
in terms of the overall interest that the state relied on in support of
its program of compulsory high school education, the Court held the
compulsory school attendance law had been unconstitutionally ap-
plied to the Amish parents.'0
Relying on the decision in Prince v. Massachusetts,4' the state
made a final argument that the state as parens patriae had the
33. 406 U.S. at 209-13.
34. Id. at 219.
35. Id. at 213.
36. Id. at 214.
37. See supra notes 24-29 and accompanying text.
38. Possibly this balancing of interests was a necessary step because the state's interest
in compulsory education was strong if not compelling. It appears as though once a religious
defense is asserted, and the state demonstrates a strong but not compelling interest, the Court
will balance the interest of both sides, concentrating on the harm which would result to both
interests as the result of a decision for either side. Whichever interest is likely to suffer the
most harm is likely to be the interest which receives protection from the Court. See 406 U.S.
at 219-29. One commentator suggests that the Court in Yoder gave the state's interest too
modest a value when weighing the interests involved. Mansfield, The Religion Clauses of the
First Amendment and the Philosophy of the Constitution, 72 CALIF. L. REv. 847, 899 (1984).
See Pepper, Reynolds, Yoder and Beyond: Alternatives for the Free Exercise Clause, 1981
UTAH L. REv. 309, 343 (suggesting that the Court might have reached a different result in
Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158 (1944), if the type of balancing test applied in Yoder
were applied to the facts of the Prince decision).
39. 406 U.S. at 219.
40. Id. at 235, 236.
41. 321 U.S. 158 (1944). See supra notes 20-23 and accompanying text.
power to extend the benefit of secondary education to children, re-
gardless of the wishes of the parents. The Court disagreed and dis-
tinguished the Prince decision on the ground that the situation
before the Court in Yoder did not involve "any harm to the physical
or mental health of the child or to the public safety, peace, order or
welfare. 42
In the aftermath of the Yoder decision, it was unclear whether
the Court would continue to expand the protection afforded under its
new free exercise doctrine. With the decision in United States
v.Lee,"4 however, it appears that the Court has halted the movement
towards further expansion of the protection afforded by the free ex-
ercise clause, and may have even cut back the scope of that protec-
tion.4 In the Lee decision, an Amish employer failed to pay social
security taxes because he believed that such payment and receipt of
benefits would violate the Amish faith.45 Although Congress had
provided Amish employees with an exemption from paying social se-
curity taxes,"6 the Court held that neither the exemption nor the free
exercise clause would exempt the Amish employer from paying the
tax. The Court concluded that the soundness of the social security
system was of such an overriding governmental interest as to justify
the limitation on religious liberty.'7
There is justification in the statement that in the Lee decision,
the Court has taken a step back in free exercise doctrine, as Justice
Stevens noted in his concurring opinion:
The Court's attempt to distinguish Yoder is unconvincing be-
cause precisely the same religious interest is implicated in both
cases, and Wisconsin's interest in requiring its children to attend
school until they reach the age of 16 is surely not inferior to the
42. 406 U.S. at 230.
43. 455 U.S. 252 (1982).
44. See Mansfield, The Religion Clauses of the First Amendment and the Philosophy
of the Constitution, 72 CALIF. L. REV. 847, 901-02 (1984) (suggesting that in the Lee decision,
the Court adopted a more lax standard than the standard applied in the Yoder and Sherbert
decisions).
45. The Amish believe there is a religiously based obligation to provide for fellow mem-
bers the kind of assistance contemplated by the social security system. U.S. v. Lee, 455 U.S. at
257.
46. 26 U.S.C. § 1402(g) (1982) provides in part:
(1) Exemption
Any individual may file an application . . .for an exemption from the tax
imposed by this chapter if he is a member of a recognized religious sect or divi-
sion thereof and is an adherent of established tenets or teachings of such sect or
division by reason of which he is conscientiously opposed to acceptance of the
benefits of any private or public insurance which makes payment in the event of
death, disability, old-age, or retirement or makes payments toward the cost of or
provides services for, medical care (including the benefits of any insurance sys-
tem established by the Social Security Act).
47. 455 U.S. at 256-61.
federal interest in collecting these social security taxes. 8
Thus, it appears that Lee has called a halt to the movement ex-
panding the protection afforded by the free exercise clause begun in
Sherbert and continued in Yoder. Viewing the Court's decisions in
Sherbert, and more importantly Yoder, however, it is clear that the
free exercise doctrine of Reynolds v. United States 9 and Prince v.
Massachusetts"° has been transformed. In Yoder, criminal action
was sheltered, not where the state's interest at stake was administra-
tive or financial but in the context of a substantial governmental in-
terest - universal education and the welfare of children.5 1 But as
Justice Stevens noted in the Lee decision, the content of the trans-
formed doctrine remains unclear.52 In any event, for purposes of ana-
lyzing the Barnhart decision, it appears that conduct which endan-
gers a child's life would not be protected under the Court's decision
in Yoder, the Court's most expansive reading of the free exercise
clause.
III. State's Power to Intervene into Parental Autonomy in the Area
of Medical Decision-Making for Children Under Doctrine of Parens
Patriae.
A parent's interest in the upbringing and care of his or her chil-
dren is constitutionally protected.58 As indicated by the United
States Supreme Court decision in Prince v. Massachusetts,54 how-
ever, the rights of parenthood are not without limitation. At common
law, a parent, guardian, or anyone standing in such a relationship
had the duty to furnish necessaries, including medical care, to a mi-
nor unemancipated child.55 A parent who neglected to furnish his or
48. 455 U.S. at 263 (Stevens, J., concurring).
49. 98 U.S. 145 (1878). See supra notes 9-13 and accompanying text.
50. 321 U.S. 158 (1944). See supra notes 20-23 and accompanying text.
51. Pepper, Reynolds, Yoder and Beyond: Alternatives for the Free Exercise Clause,
UTAH L. REV. 309, 344 (1981).
52. For a comprehensive analysis of religion and the first amendment, see The Religion
Clauses, 72 CALIF. L. REV. 753 (1984).
53. See Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745 (1982) (before a state may sever completely
and irrevocably the rights of parents in their natural child, due process requires that the state
support its allegations by at least clear and convincing evidence); Parham v. JR, 442 U.S. 584
(1979) (parents, who have traditional interest in, and responsibility for, the upbringing of a
child, retain a substantial role in the decision to institutionalize a child, subject to an indepen-
dent medical judgment); Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972); Stanley v. Illinois, 405
U.S. 645 (1972) (state cannot presume that unmarried fathers in general and a specific unwed
father in particular are unsuitable and neglectful parents without individualized proof); Pierce
v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510 (1925) (act requiring parents and guardians to send chil-
dren only to public school was an unreasonable interference with the liberty of the parents and
guardians to direct the upbringing of the children); Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390 (1923)
(law forbidding the teaching of a foreign language to children in schools invaded liberty guar-
anteed by the fourteenth amendment).
54. 321 U.S. 158 (1944). See supra notes 20-23 and accompanying text.
55. See, e.g., Mitchell v. Davis, 205 S.W. 812 (Tex. Civ. App. 1947); Wallace v. Cox,
her child with medical care was subject to criminal sanctions; and in
the event neglect caused the child's death, the parent was subject to
prosecution for murder or manslaughter, depending on the parent's
intent.56
Realizing the need to protect children from abuse, states began
legislating for the protection of children under the doctrine of parens
patriae57 Neglect statutes,58 enacted under the authority of this doc-
trine, empower the states with the authority to alter or terminate the
relationship between a parent and a minor child when necessary to
protect the best interest of the child.59
In the area of medical decision-making for children, states often
rely on neglect statutes in order to assure that a child's best interests
are protected. Because this action often intrudes on traditional areas
of parental autonomy,60 courts must balance the interests of parent
and state. 6' When the child involved is competent, the desire of the
child must also be considered. 62 Additionally, where a parent's re-
fusal to consent to a medical procedure is grounded upon religious
objections, the balancing is further complicated.
Although the United States Supreme Court has not explicitly
stated what protection should be accorded the parental decision to
withhold medical treatment, state courts have uniformly held that
when a child's life is threatened, the necessary medical treatment
may be ordered, 3s even over parental religious objections.64 In over-
136 Tenn. 69, 188 S.W. 611 (1916); Owens v. State, 6 Okla. Crim. I10, 116 P. 345 (1911);
State v. Chenowith, 163 Ind. 94, 71 N.E. 197 (1904).
56. See, e.g., State v. Barnes, 141 Tenn. 469, 212 S.W. 100 (1919).
57. "[L]iterally, 'parent of the country,' refers traditionally to role of state as sovereign
and guardian of persons under legal disability." BLACK'S LAW Dic'iONARY 1003 (5th ed.
1979). Under this doctrine the state acts as the primary protector of children from abuse or
neglect. For a comprehensive analysis of the development of the doctrine, see Areen, Interven-
tion Between Parent and Child: A Reappraisal of the State's Role in Child Neglect and
Abuse Cases, 63 GEO. L.J. 887, 897-910 (1975); Rendleman, Parens Patriae: From Chancery
to the Juvenile Court, 23 S.C.L. REV. 205 (1971).
58. For a comparative analysis of state neglect laws, see Katz, Howe & McGrath,
Child Neglect Laws in America, pts. 1-IV, 9 FAM. L.Q. 3, 7, 51, 73 (1975).
59. The doctrine of parens patriae may be invoked in a variety of situations. This com-
ment is only concerned with the doctrine's applicability to the area of medical decision-making
for children.
60. See, e.g., People ex. rel. Wallace v. Labrenz, 411 111. 618, 104 N.E.2d 769, cert.
denied, 344 U.S. 824 (1952).
61. The interests are the parents' constitutionally protected right of controlling the up-
bringing and care of their children and the state's concern for the protection of children. See
supra notes 53, 57 and accompanying text.
62. See, e.g., In re Green, 448 Pa. 338, 292 A.2d 387 (1972). see infra notes 115-16
and accompanying text.
63. See, e.g., Custody of a Minor, 375 Mass. 733, 379 N.E.2d 1053 91978), aftd, 396
Mass. 325, 393 N.E.2d 836 (1979); In re Cicero, 101 Misc.2d 699, 421 N.Y.S.2d 965 (N.Y.
Sup. Ct. 1979).
64. See, e.g., People ex. rel. Wallace v.Labrenz, 411 Ill. 618, 104 N.E.2d 769, cert.
denied, 344 U.S. 824 (1952); Morrison v. State, 252 S.W.2d 97 (Mo. Ct. App. 1952); State v.
Perricone, 37 N.J. 463, 181 A.2d 751, cert. denied, 371 U.S. 890 (1962); In re Clark, 21 Ohio
riding religious objections to necessary medical treatment where a
child's life is threatened, state courts have often relied on the United
States Supreme Court decisions in Reynolds v. United States" and
Prince v. Massachusetts" in order to justify the state intervention,
and in particular, on the following language from Prince: "Parents
may be free to become martyrs themselves. But it does not follow
they are free, in identical circumstances, to make martyrs of their
children before they have reached the age of full and legal discretion
when they can make that choice for themselves." 767 Concluding that
the state's interest in protecting a child's life is more compelling than
the state interest proferred in the Reynolds and Prince decisions, the
court will order the necessary treatment."8
When a child's life is not immediately threatened, there has
been much controversy over what circumstances justify state inter-
vention. 9 Most courts respect the parental decision to withhold med-
ical treatment unless the child's life is in immediate danger;70 how-
Op.2d 86, 185 N.E.2d 128 (C.P. Lucas Cty. 1962).
65. 98 U.S. 145 (1878). See supra notes 9-13 and accompanying text.
66. 321 U.S. 158 (1944). See supra notes 20-23 and accompanying text.
67. People ex rel. Wallace v. Labrenz, 411 I1. at 626, 104 N.E.2d at 774 (quoting
from Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158, 170 (1944)); State v. Perricone, 37 N.J. at 473-
74, 181 A.2d at 757 (quoting from Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158, 170 (1944)).
68. See, e.g., State v. Perricone, 37 N.J. at 474, 181 A.2d at 757.
69. See generally Bennet, Allocation of Child Medical Care Decisionmaking Author-
ity: A Suggested Interest Analysis, 62 VA. L. REv. 285 (1976) (suggesting medical care to be
ordered in non-emergency situations when in child's best interest); Baker, Court Ordered Non-
Emergency Medical Care for Infants, 18 CLEv.-MAR. L. REv. 296 (1969) (concluding that
great caution should be taken when courts invoke discretionary privilege in non-emergency
situations); Council of Judges, National Council on Crime and Delinquency, Guides to the
Judge in Medical Orders Affecting Children, 14 CRIME & DELINQ. 107 (1968) (suggesting
treatment be ordered only in emergencies); Comment, The Outer Limits of Parental Auton-
omy: Withholding Medical Treatment from Children, 42 OHIo ST. L.J. 813 (1981) (sug-
gesting that the parental decision to withhold medical treatment from a child should not be
upheld in the absence of a solid medical basis supporting the parental choice); Note, Judicial
Limitations on Parental Autonomy in the Medical Treatment of Minors, 59 NEa. L. REv.
1093 (1980) (suggesting that treatment in non-emergency situations may be against the best
interest of the child even where the child stands to physically benefit, because of stress placed
on family as a result of such a decision).
70. See, e.g., In re Seiferth, 309 N.Y. 80, 127 N.E.2d 820 (1955) (upholding parental
decision to withhold surgery to correct child's harelip and cleft palate where parent objected
based on belief in mental healing); In re Green, 448 Pa. 338, 292 A.2d 387 (1972) (upholding
parental decision to withhold medical treatment based on religious objection where child's life
was not in immediate danger); In re Tuttendario, 21 Pa. D. 651 (Q.S. Phila. Co. 1912) (up-
holding parental decision to withhold surgical treatment from child suffering from rickets); In
re Phillip B., 92 Cal. App. 3d 796, 156 Cal. Rptr. 48 (1979), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 949
(1980) (upholding parental decision to withhold surgery to correct a congenital heart defect of
a twelve year old Down's Syndrome child); In re Frank, 41 Wash. 2d 294, 248 P.2d 553
(1952) (father did not neglect child by withholding medical treatment needed to correct
speech impediment); In re Hudson, 13 Wash. 2d 673, 126 P.2d 765 (1942) (upholding paren-
tal decision to withhold amputation of grossly deformed arm of child preventing child from
leading normal life). Compare People ex. rel. D.L.E., 200 Colo. 244, 614 P.2d 873 (1980)
(court refused to order medical treatment when child's life not endangered) with People ex.
tel. D.L.E., 645 P.2d 271 (Colo. 1982) (court ordered treatment when child's life endangered).
ever, there is significant authority to the contrary.71 The Supreme
Court's language in Prince, which is echoed in Wisconsin v. Yoder,7
seems to support the view that there may be situations where it is
proper to order medical treatment where a child's life is not at stake.
In the Prince decision, the Court stated that "[tihe right to practice
religion freely does not include liberty to expose the community or
the child to communicable disease or the latter to ill health or
death."7 In the Yoder decision, the Court distinguished Prince on
the ground that the situation before the Court did not involve "any
harm to the physical or mental health of the child or to the public
safety, peace, order, or welfare. '74 Courts have applied the language
from Prince in the medical decision-making context to conclude that
medical care may be ordered. 75 This reasoning, however, involves
considerable speculation since the Court was not addressing the issue
when using the quoted language. In any event, although ordering
medical treatment in non-emergency situations may not be justified,
it is clear that a court may properly order medical care for a child
whose life is endangered.
IV. Criminal Liability of Parents Causing Child's Death by Failing
to Provide Medical Care Because of Religious Beliefs in States other
than Pennsylvania.
Although it is clear that a state may intervene and order life-
saving medical care for a child whose life is endangered, regardless
of parental religious objections,76 it is unclear whether a parent
should be criminally liable for causing a child's death by relying on
faith to the exclusion of modern medicine. 7 The decision by the
71. Many courts have ordered medical treatment over parental objections in non-emer-
gency situations. See, e.g., Muhlenberg Hospital v. Patterson, 128 N.J. Super. 498, 320 A.2d
518 (1974) (court ordered blood transfusion over religious objections of parents where failure
to order transfusion could result in irreparable brain damage to child); In re Sampson, 65
Misc.2d 658, 317 N.Y.S.2d 641 (N.Y. Fain. Ct. 1970), affd, 37 A.D.2d 668, 323 N.Y.S.2d
253 (1971), affid 29 N.Y.2d 900, 278 N.e.2d 918, 328 N.Y.S.2d 686 (1972) (upholding order
for blood transfusion over parental religious objections where failure to order might cause
serious psychological impairment to child but did not threaten physical life or health of child);
In re Gregory S., 85 Misc.2d 846, 380 N.Y.S.2d 620 (N.Y. Fain. Ct. 1976) (denying mother's
religious objections to permitting medical or dental care for child suffering from umbiblical
hernia, cavities, and fractured teeth); In re Rotkowitz, 175 Misc. 948, 25 N.Y.S.2d 624 (N.Y.
Dom. Rel. Ct. 1941) (operation to correct and prevent extension of leg deformity induced by
poliomyelitis ordered over father's objection where mother consented thereto); In re Vasco, 238
A.D. 128, 263 N.Y.S. 552 (1933) (ordering removal of child's eye over parental religious
objections where failure to do so could result in child's death).
72. 406 U.S. 205 (1972). See supra notes 30-42 and accompanying text.
73. 321 U.S. at 166-67 (emphasis added).
74. 406 U.S. at 230 (emphasis added).
75. See. e.g., Jehovah's Witnesses in St. of Wash. v. King County Hosp., 278 F. Supp.
488, 504 (W.D. Wash. 1967).
76. See supra note 64 and accompanying text.
77. See generally Cawley, Criminal Liability in Faith Healing, 39 MINN. L. REv. 48
New York Court of Appeals in People v. Pierson 7  has been consid-
ered the leading decision in the United States holding a parent crim-
inally liable under these circumstances. s In Pierson, the defendant
had been indicted for violating a section of the New York Penal
Code which basically provided that whoever willfully omitted, with-
out lawful excuse, to furnish medical care to a minor was guilty of a
misdemeanor. The defendant, a member of the faith-healing Chris-
tian Catholic Church of Chicago, refused to call a physician, and as
a result, his sixteen-month-old daughter died of pneumonia. The de-
fendant did not believe in physicians but believed his child would
recover through prayer.80
The court, in considering whether faith healing could be in-
cluded within the definition of medical attendance as used in the
statute, traced the development of healing of the sick through divine
intervention"' from the days following the adoption of Christianity in
Rome until the middle of the eighteenth century. The court then
traced the development of medicine from the eighteenth century,
noting the change in public sentiment in favor of the practice of
medicine to the extent that those having the duty to care for others
were required to seek medical assistance for those suffering from se-
rious illness.82 In view of this change in public sentiment, the court
concluded that medical assistance meant attendance by a physician
regularly licensed under the laws of the state.83 The court then ad-
dressed the defendant's claim that his conduct was protected by the
free exercise clause:
A person cannot, under the guise of religious belief, practice po-
lygamy, and still be protected from our statutes constituting the
crime of bigamy. He cannot, under the belief or profession of a
belief that he should be relieved from the care of children, be
excused from punishment for slaying those who have been born
(1954) (suggesting that criminal liability should be imposed not only on parents but also on
the leaders of churches who aid the parents); Trescher and O'Neill, Jr., Medical Care for
Dependent Children: Manslaughter Liability of the Christian Scientist, 109 U. PA. L. REV.
203 (1960) (suggesting criminal liability should not be imposed in light of public acceptance of
spiritual healing practices); Note, Criminal Law - Manslaughter Conviction for Failure to
Provide Medical Aid to Child Because of Religious Belief Reversed, 9 DEPAUL L. REV. 271
(1960) (suggesting religious belief not a defense but best defense).
78. 176 N.Y. 201, 68 N.E. 243 (1903).
79. Cawley, Criminal Liability in Faith Healing, 39 MINN. L. REV. 48, 57 (1954).
80. 176 N.Y. at 204, 68 N.E. at 244.
81. The court noted that for a thousand years or more it was considered to be dishonor-
able to practice physic or surgery. At the Lateran Council of the Church, held early in the
thirteenth century, physicians were forbidden to undertake medical treatment without calling
in a priest. Those who did not comply were expelled from the church. Pope Pius V enforced
the penalties two hundred and fifty years later. Id. at 207, 68 N.E. at 245.
82. Id. at 210, 68 N.E. at 245-46.
83. Id. at 210, 68 N.E. at 246.
to him. 4
Accordingly, the court affirmed the defendant's conviction.
The rationale of the Pierson court was followed in Oklahoma in
Owens v. State,85 where the defendant was charged with committing
a misdemeanor for willfully and without lawful excuse omitting to
furnish medical attendance to his minor child who died of typhoid
fever. The court held that religious belief constituted no defense for
violating a penal statute, relying mainly on the Pierson decision and
the United States Supreme Court decision in Reynolds v. United
States."
In both the Pierson and Owens decisions, the defendants were
convicted of violating criminal neglect laws. Although criminal lia-
bility was imposed in both decisions, neither decision involved a
charge of involuntary manslaughter. In decisions where defendants
were charged with involuntary manslaughter, the courts have shown
a reluctance to impose liability.
In State v. Chenowith,87 the Supreme Court of Indiana stated
in dicta that under the circumstances of the case, religious belief
would be no defense to a prosecution for manslaughter.88 The de-
fendant in the case had been indicted for involuntary manslaughter
for causing the death of his eight-month-old child who died of pneu-
monia. The defendant did not call a physician, but did call an
"elder" who annointed the child with oil and prayed to God to heal
the child.8a The court acquitted the defendant because of a proce-
dural error committed by the trial court.90
In another case involving a manslaughter conviction, the Su-
preme Court of Maine, in State v. Sandford,"9 showed reluctance to
impose liability under similar circumstances. The defendant had
been indicted and convicted of manslaughter for causing the death of
a member of defendant's religious sect.92 The court reversed the de-
fendant's conviction because the trial judge's charge to the jury ef-
fectively asked them to decide the efficacy of prayer for the cure of
84. Id. at 211, 68 N.E. at 246.
85. 6 Okla. Crim. 110, 116 P. 345 (1911).
86. Id. at - 116 P. at 346. See also Beck v. State, 29 Okla. Crim. 240, 233 P. 495
(1925) (followed Owens in affirming conviction but removed jail sentence as excessive).
87. 163 Ind. 94, 71 N.E. 197 (1904).
88. Id. at 99, 71 N.E. at 199.
89. This was the common practice when a member of the church community became
ill. Id. at 97, 71 N.E. at 198-99.
90. Id. at 99, 71 N.E. at 199.
91. 99 Me. 441, 59 A. 597 (1905).
92. The defendant was the leader of a religious community which believed that "the
proper treatment of the sick was not by the use of medical remedies, but by prayer for recov-
ery, after a confession of sin." Id. at 445, 59 A. at 598.
the sick.93 Under such a charge, a defendant tried by two juries
under the same set of facts, could be convicted by one and acquitted
by the other. The court indicated in dicta that if the defendant did
not believe scientific methods could cure the sick, but believed in
another recognized method, and pursued that method, there could be
no neglect.9
4
Perhaps the most striking example of judicial reluctance to im-
pose liability in this type of situation is exemplified by the Supreme
Court of Florida's decision in Bradley v. State." In Bradley, the de-
fendant's daughter had fallen into a fire and received serious burns.
Because of the defendant's religious beliefs, he refused to provide
medical care for five weeks, after which time he hospitalized her.
The girl eventually died. Physicians at the hospital testified that if
the girl had received medical treatment shortly after being burned,
she would have recovered. The court, reversing the defendant's con-
viction for manslaughter, based its decision on causation, stating:
Nor can it be fairly said that the allegations or proofs show that
any 'culpable negligence' of the father caused 'the killing of' the
child. Manifestly the death of the child was caused by the acci-
dental burning in which the father had no part . . . . [T]he ab-
sence of medical attention did not cause 'the killing' of the child,
even if the failure or refusal of the father to provide medical
attention was 'culpable negligence' within the intent of the
statute.9"
The Bradley court's finding that the father did not cause the death
of the child seems unjustified in view of expert testimony that indi-
cated that the child would have lived had she received proper treat-
ment promptly.
The Court of Appeals of Maryland reached a similar conclusion
in Craig v. State.'7 In Craig, the defendants, a father and mother,
had been convicted of involuntary manslaughter for failure to pro-
vide medical care for their child who died of pneumonia. The de-
fendants were members of the Church of God which had as a central
tenet a belief in divine healing.' s The state charged that the defend-
ants were grossly negligent in failing to provide medical care for the
child during an illness that proved fatal. In order to sustain a convic-
93. The charge basically required the jurors to decide whether or not a reasonable man
would believe that prayer would heal the child. Id. at 450, 59 A. at 600-01.
94. Id. at 451, 59 A. at 601.
95. 79 Fla. 651, 84 So. 677 (1920).
96. Id. at 655-56, 84 So. at 679.
97. 220 Md. 590, 155 A.2d 684 (1959).
98. The belief was based on a portion of the New Testament, The Epistle of James
5:14, 15 which states: "If there be any sick among you, let him call in the Elders of the
Church." Id. at 593, 155 A.2d at 686.
tion for involuntary manslaughter, the state had to prove that gross
negligence was the proximate cause of death. Relying on Pierson,
the court concluded that religious belief was no defense under the
circumstances. Nonetheless, because the state had not proved that
the defendants' omission was the proximate cause of the child's
death, the court reversed the convictions.9'
Finally, the Supreme Court of California also reviewed a man-
slaughter conviction which involved a mother whose child had died
from getting a hair ball caught in her intestine. The mother treated
the child with enemas, compresses, and prayer. 100 The court held
that these were not substitutes for the type of care envisioned under
the state's child care statute, but reversed the conviction because of a
procedural error.
A review of the foregoing cases reveals that in each of the deci-
sions involving manslaughter prosecutions, the court found some way
in which to acquit the defendants. The most extreme cases are the
decisions which held that the prosecution did not prove causation. It
is possible that the courts in Bradley and Craig were demonstrating
judicial reluctance to impose liability in these situations. Regardless
of the undesirability of imposing criminal liability in these situations,
however, an accurate statement of the law is that punishment of de-
fendants in these circumstances is constitutional, and, barring an ex-
emption from liability in state law, may be properly imposed by state
courts.
In recognition of the harsh results of the decisions reached in
both Pierson and Owens, the legislatures of New York" 1 and
Oklahoma1 02 have acted to remedy the situation. Both states now
99. The court was of the opinion that the testimony indicated that the seriousness of
the pneumonia which caused the child's death did not become evident to the defendants until
two or three days before the child died, at a time when the child could not have been saved
even if she had been properly attended. Id. at 598-99, 155 A.2d at 689.
100. People v. Arnold, 66 Cal. 2d 438, 426 P.2d 515, 58 Cal. Rptr. 115 (1967).
101. New York has enacted the following provision:
§ 260.15 Endangering the welfare of a child; defense
In any prosecution for endangering the welfare of a child, pursuant to section
260.10, based upon an alleged failure or refusal to provide proper medical care
or treatment to an ill child, it is an affirmative defense that the defendant (a) is
a parent, guardian or other person legally charged with the care or custody of
such chlid [sic]; and (b) is a member or adherent of an organized church or
religious group the tenets of which prescribe prayer as the principle treatment
for illness; and (c) treated or caused such ill child to be treated in accordance
with such tenets.
N.Y. PENAL LAW § 260.15 (McKinney 1980).
102. Oklahoma has enacted the following provision:
§ 1130. Termination of parental rights in certain situations.
B. Unless otherwise provided for by law, any parent or legal custodian of a
child who willfully omits without lawful excuse, to perform any duty imposed
upon such parent or legal custodian by law to furnish necessary food, clothing
have statutory provisions which exempt from criminal liability those
parents who depend on spiritual means alone in accordance with the
tenets of a recognized religion in the treatment of their children.
Many other states have also enacted similar provisions." 8
V. Development in Pennsylvania
A. Prior to Barnhart Decision
The Pennsylvania Superior Court, in Commonwealth v. Barn-
hart,104 is the first appellate court in Pennsylvania to resolve the is-
sue of whether a parent should be held criminally liable for failing to
provide medical care, based on religious beliefs, and thus causing a
child's death. The Barnhart court, deciding to impose criminal liabil-
ity, relied heavily on the United States Supreme Court decision in
Prince v. Massachusetts.'"5 The court thus chose not to follow two
Pennsylvania County Court decisions which had dealt with the issue.
The earlier of the two decisions, Commonwealth v. Hoffman,106
involved a child whose death was caused by scarlet fever. The de-
fendant parent chose not to call in a physician but instead relied on
the elders of a Christian Scientist Church, who prayed for the child
and annointed the child with oil.'07 The State charged the defendant
with involuntary manslaughter. The defendant claimed his conduct
was protected, but the court gave little consideration to the defense
of religious belief, stating:
In other words, if, independently of his religious belief, what he
did or omitted to do was criminal in the eyes of the law, the fact
that it was done or left undone in obedience to his religious be-
lief would not make it less a crime. If religious belief could be
made the excuse for criminal action or inaction, what crimes
might not be committed in the name of religion? 108
The defendant was found guilty of involuntary manslaughter.
shelter or medical attendance for such child, upon conviction, is guilty of a mis-
demeanor .... Nothing in this section shall be construed to mean a child is
endangered for the sole reason the parent or guardian, in good faith, selects and
depends upon spiritual means alone through prayer in accordance with the tenets
or practice of a recognized church or religious denomination for the treatment of
[sic] care of disease or remedial care of such child; provided, that medical care
shall be provided where permanent physical damage could result to such child;
and that the laws, rules and regulations relating to communicable diseases and
sanitary matters are not violated ....
OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 10, § 1130(B) (West Supp. 1985).
103. See infra note 169.
104. 345 Pa. Super. 10, 497 A.2d 616 (1985).
105. 321 U.S. 158 (1944). See supra notes 20-23 and accompanying text.
106. 29 Pa. C. 65 (Butler Co. 1903).
107. There is no indication in the opinion whether the defendant himself was a member
of the Christian Scientist Church.
108. Id. at 67.
Commonwealth v. Breth,109 also involved an indictment for in-
voluntary manslaughter, and the court reached the same result
under similar circumstances. The defendant had neglected to provide
his child with medical care, not because it was a sin under his reli-
gion to provide the child with medical care, but because he believed
prayer would cure the child.110 The court rejected the defendant's
religious defense stating:
It would not be a lawful excuse for the nonperformance of this
duty that he entertained some religious or conscientious belief
that it was unnecessary or that he had no intent to do anything
which would interfere with the recovery of the child nor that he
was honestly mistaken as to the efficacy of the means which he
did use.1"1
Regardless of religion, the defendant had a duty to provide medical
care to his child: "his failure to provide the means ordinarily used by
prudent men and at his disposal would be gross or culpable negli-
gence,"' 1 2 constituting involuntary manslaughter. Under these stan-
dards, the defendant was found guilty of involuntary
manslaughter. 113
Although the Pennsylvania Supreme Court has not directly ad-
dressed this issue on its merits, it has indicated in decisions dealing
with related issues that there is apparently no legal obstacle to im-
posing criminal liability in these situations. In In re Green,114 where
the state sought a judicial declaration that a minor was a neglected
child under the Juvenile Court Law, '15 the court held that "as be-
tween a parent and the state, the'state does not have an interest of
sufficient magnitude outweighing a parent's religious beliefs when
the child's life is not immediately imperiled by his physical condi-
tion." ' Under this reasoning, it would seem that the obverse would
109. 44 Pa. C. 56 (Clearfield Co. 1915).
110. Id. at 58.
111. Id. at 66.
112. Id.
113. Id. at 68.
114. 448 Pa. 338, 292 A.2d 387 (1972).
115. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 11, § 243(c) (Purdon 1965) provided that a neglected child
was: "A child whose parent, guardian, custodian or legal representative neglects or refuses to
provide proper or necessary subsistence, education, medical or surgical care, or other care
necessary for his or her health, morals or well being .... This law has been repealed.
116. Id. at 348, 292 A.2d at 392. The case involved a sixteen-year-old minor who suf-
fered from curvature of the spine. Doctors recommended a spinal fusion to relieve the minor of
her bent position. The mother, a member of the Jehovah's Witnesses, consented to the surgery
on the condition that the minor receive no blood transfusions. Since blood transfusions were
required for the surgery, the mother was effectively withholding consent to the operation. The
Supreme Court, although holding that the state's interest was not of a sufficient magnitude to
outweigh the parent's religious beliefs, nevertheless remanded the decision for a determination
of the child's wishes, since the child was sixteen and of sufficient maturity to make the decision
for herself. The child's preferences were held to be superior to the mother's. The decision is
be true. Thus, when a child's life is immediately endangered, the
state's interest outweighs any parental interest in exercising religion.
Furthermore, the decisions in Breth and Hoffman were cited
with approval in Commonwealth v. Konz." 7 In Konz, the Pennsylva-
nia Supreme Court addressed the issue of whether one spouse has a
duty to seek medical care for the other spouse, when the other
spouse competently refuses such treatment. The defendant's husband
in Konz, a diabetic for seventeen years, was a Reverend who publicly
proclaimed his desire to discontinue insulin treatment in reliance on
the belief that God would heal him." 8 The defendant stood by and
did nothing as her husband showed symptoms of lack of insulin.119
When the Reverend died from lack of insulin, the defendant was
charged with involuntary manslaughter.2 0 The court cited the Breth
and Hoffman decisions to support the proposition that a parent may
be held guilty of involuntary manslaughter for the failure to seek
medical assistance for his sick child. The court concluded, however,
that a spouse may not be found guilty of involuntary manslaughter
for the death of the other spouse, because a spouse owes no duty to
often cited for the proposition that a child's interest should be considered in medical decision-
making for children when a child is of sufficient maturity .to make the decision. See, e.g.,
Mark, The Competent Child's Preferences in Critical Medical Decisions: A Proposal for its
Consideration, 11 W. ST. U.L. REV. 25 (1983).
The Jehovah's Witnesses have been involved in numerous controversies regarding blood
transfusions. For a general discussion of these controversies, see Comment, Their Life is in the
Blood: Jehovah's Witnesses, Blood Transfusions and the Courts, 10 N.K.L. REV. 281 (1983);
Jehovah's Witnesses and the Question of Blood, WATCH TOWER BIBLE AND TRACT SOCIETY
OF PENNSYLVANIA 17 (1977).
117. 498 Pa. 639, 644, 450 A.2d 638, 641 (1982).
118. Id. at 641, 450 A.2d at 639.
119. The Reverend spent the day before he died in bed vomiting intermittently. When
he became restless, the defendant applied cracked ice but did not summon medical aid. Late
that night or early the next morning, he died while others in his home were sleeping. Id. at
643, 450 A.2d at 640.
120. 18 PA. CoNs. STAT. § 2504 (1982) provides as follows:
§ 2504. Involuntary Manslaughter
(a) General rule. - A person is guilty of involuntary manslaughter when as
the direct result of the doing of an unlawful act in a reckless or grossly negligent
manner, or the doing of a lawful act in a reckless or grossly negligent manner,
he causes the death of another person.
(b) Grading. - Involuntary manslaughter is a misdemeanor of the first
degree.
The state was attempting to establish the unlawful act requirement of involuntary man-
slaughter by the defendant's omission to summon medical aid for her dying spouse. The status
of omissions as to whether they are criminal or not is provided for in 18 PA. CoNs. STAT. §
301(b) (1983) which provides as follows:
(b) Omission as basis of liability. - Liability for the commission of an
offense may not be based on an omission unaccompanied by action unless:
I). the omission is expressly made sufficient by the law defining the
offense; or
2). a duty to perform the omitted act is otherwise imposed by law.
In order for the defendant to be convicted for involuntary manslaughter under 18 PA.
CONS. STAT. § 2504, the state would have to demonstrate that the defendant had a duty to
provide medical care to her husband under 18 PA. CoNs. STAT. § 301(b).
seek medical care for his or her spouse, at least where that spouse
has competently chosen not to receive medical care.12 1 By approving
the Breth and Hoffman decisions, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court
appears to have indirectly acquiesced in those courts' holdings that a
religious belief is no defense to the imposition of criminal liability on
parents who have caused the death of their children by failing to
provide them with medical care.
B. Decision in Barnhart
William and Linda Barnhart were life-long members of the
Faith Tabernacle Church. A central tenet of this faith is that life
rests ultimately in God's hands. 122  Three generations of the
Barnharts had adhered to that belief.1 28 As a result of these beliefs,
the Barnharts did not seek medical aid when they noticed the growth
on their son at least five months before his death."" Testimony of
William Barnhart at the coroner's inquest indicated that the
121. 498 Pa. at 646-47, 450 A.2d at 642-43. But cf Westrup v. Commonwealth, 123
Ky. 95, 93 S.W. 646 (1906) (holding that one spouse owes a duty to provide medical care to
the other spouse where the other spouse is in a helpless state); State v. Mally, 1139 Mont. 599,
366 P.2d 868 (1961) (defendant convicted of involuntary manslaughter where he allowed his
wife to lay in a semi-comatose condition for two days without providing medical care, and such
delay caused death).
122. Commonwealth v. Barnhart, 345 Pa. Super. 10, 497 A.2d 616, 621 (1985). Pastor
Charles Wallace Nixon testified that the church was more concerned for the child's spiritual
interest than it was for his physical well being:
Well, the only greater concern would have been his spiritual interest or eter-
nal interest.
It has been stated by our presiding elder, by Pastor Reinert, he said, 'that
the courts and people would not possibly as a whole accept a statement like that,
but it has been said that it is an abuse or child abuse or in other words harmful
to the child.' We would consider going to a doctor and trusting in medicine
doing greater harm because it would be harmful as we believe in our belief, it
would be harming the spiritual and eternal interest of the child and the parents
as well in doing so.
Id. at 20-21, 497 A.2d at 622.
123. Id. at 20, 497 A.2d at 621. William Barnhart testified that his mother and father
belonged to the Faith Tabernacle Congregation and that he and his brother and sisters had all
been born at home without medical care. His father had joined the church when he was seri-
ously ill. Upon repenting of his sins and being annointed, his father recovered from his illness.
Id. at 20 n.5, 497 A.2d at 621 n.5.
William Barnhart served without pay in World War II because of his religious beliefs. He
had visited a doctor only for employment physicals and his children had never received medi-
cal treatment. He testified as follows concerning an incident involving one of his children:
Bill, when he was about five years old, had a severe sick spell, lost all his hair,
his eyebrows. I don't know what the disease was. He was practically yellow. We
had him annointed and it was - I don't know if it was overnight or the next day
he started to recover and he received all his hair back his color and that is him
sitting there now.
Id. at 20 n.5, 479 A.2d at 622 n.5.
124. Id. at 27-28, 479 A.2d at 625. The tumor originated in the child's kidney. The
mechanism of death was emaciation in that the tumor was the largest single structure in the
child's body. The tumor had a tremendous demand for nourishment, and at the same time, by
crowding and obstructing the intestines prevented the child from taking nourishment. The
child, as a result of the tumor, starved to death. Id. at 27 n.8, 479 A.2d at 625 n.8.
Barnharts were aware that their child's death was imminent.
The defendants were charged with involuntary manslaughter
and endangering the welfare of a child.12 5 At trial, the judge's in-
structions to the jury completely removed from the jury's considera-
tion the Barnharts' defense of religious belief. He charged as follows:
"Now, this case is really not a question of Christian Faith or the
efficacy of prayer. It is whether the parents of Justin failed to seek
medical assistance for a seriously ill child and that failure caused his
death." With their defense of religious belief dismantled, the
Barnharts were convicted of both involuntary manslaughter and en-
dangering the welfare of a child. 2
On appeal, the Barnharts raised five points of error, the most
important being their claim that the criminal statutes were unconsti-
tutionally applied to punish conduct protected by the free exercise
clause of the first amendment. a12  The Superior Court, addressing the
defense of religious belief, expressed the difficult position in which
courts are placed when forced to resolve the issue of whether a par-
ent should be held criminally liable in such situations: "What does
remain is troublesome. Our decision today directly penalizes appel-
lants' exercise of their religious beliefs. Appellants ask how we can
hold them criminally liable for putting their faith in God. No easy
answer attends."
12 9
The court then went on to answer the Barnharts' inquiry by first
noting that although there exists the "principle of neutrality, a belief
that religion is 'not within the cognizance of civil government,'...
[hlowever nice the distinction [is] in theory. . . it sometimes fails in
practice."130 The court then stated that "[a]ssertion of a claim of
religious right does not vouchsafe the parents secure from state influ-
125. 18 PA. CONS. STAT. § 4304 (1983), provides as follows:
A parent, guardian, or other person supervising the welfare of a child under
18 years of age commits a misdemeanor of the second degree if he knowingly
endangers the welfare of the child by violating a duty of care, protection or
support.
A proven violation of 18 PA. CONS. STAT. § 4304 would establish the "unlawful act" required
under § 2504, the section which addresses the requirements for establishing involuntary man-
slaughter. See supra note 120.
126. 345 Pa. Super. at 30, 497 A.2d at 627.
127. William Barnhart was sentenced with regard to involuntary manslaughter to a two-
month term of probation, under the following conditions: (1) that he pay the costs of prosecu-
tion; (2) that he pay $250.00 to the use of Cambria County; and (3) that he contribute 100
hours of community service.
With regard to his sentence for endangering the welfare of children, he was sentenced: (1)
to a 23-month period of probation; (2) to pay the costs of prosecution. Linda Barnhart received
similar sentences. Id. at 33 n.12, 497 A.2d at 629 n.12.
128. U.S. CoNsT. amend. I.
129. 345 Pa. Super. at 20, 497 A.2d at 621.
130. Id. at 21, 497 A.2d at 622 (citation omitted) (quoting from Reynolds v. United
States, 98 U.S. 145, 163 (1878)). See supra notes 9-13 and accompanying text.
ence in every aspect of their children's lives. '"1 ' The court then
looked to Pennsylvania law and observed that neither the Pennsylva-
nia Supreme Court nor the Superior Court had dealt with the issue
on the merits. Moreover, the court decided not to follow the deci-
sions in Commonwealth v. Breth'32 and Commonwealth v. Hoff-
man,1 3' because one "had attempted to dissolve the dilemma, while
the other rode roughshod through it.''
4
The court gave a curious reason for not following the Breth de-
cision, stating that "[t]he court in Breth simply assumed that civil
law took precedence over religious convictions. As the United States
Supreme Court decision in Wisconsin v. Yoder makes clear, that as-
sumption does not always hold. The civil law may, at time, give way
to religious beliefs.' 35 After a brief discussion of the Yoder decision,
the court concluded that Barnhart was not a case where civil law
must give way to religious beliefs, stating:
Although his life hung in the balance, Justin Barnhart here
had no voice in his parents' decision to rely on religious rather
than medical help. Precisely because a child of two years and
seven months cannot speak on his own behalf, the state has
charged the parents with the affirmative duty of providing medi-
cal care to protect the child's life. Faced with a condition which
threatened their child's life, the parents had no choice but to
seek medical help.
We recognize that our decision today directly penalizes ap-
pellants in the practice of their religion. We emphasize that the
liability attaches not to appellants' decision for themselves but
rather to their decision to effectively forfeit their child's life."
The court went on to reject other challenges,137 including the chal-
131. 345 Pa. Super. at 21, 497 A.2d at 622. The court supported this proposition by
quoting from Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158 (1944). See supra notes 20-23 and ac-
companying text.
132. 44 Pa. C. 56 (Clearfield Co. 1915). See supra notes 109-113 and accompanying
text.
133. 44 Pa. C. 65 (Butler Co. 1903). See supra notes 106, 107 and accompanying text.
134. Barnhart, 345 Pa. Super. at 23, 497 A.2d at 623 (citations omitted).
135. Id. at 24, 497 A.2d at 624 (citations omitted). See supra notes 30-42 and accompa-
nying text.
136. Id. at 25-26, 497 A.2d at 624.
137. The Barnharts raised several points of error. One of these challenges was that the
child welfare statute was vague in not defining the duty of care required, thus violating the due
process requirement of notice. See supra note 125. The court quickly disposed of this chal-
lenge, stating that "[a] parent is charged with the duty of care and control, subsistence and
education necessary for the child's physical, mental, and emotional health and morals." Id. at
18, 497 A.2d at 620-21. See 42 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 6302 (Purdon 1982) (defining depen-
dent child). The court then noted that William Barnhart's testimony at the coroner's inquest
indicated that the Barnharts knew Justin's death was imminent. Therefore the Barnharts could
not claim they had no notice. Id. at 19, 497 A.2d at 621. The court also rejected the
Barnharts' claim that the verdicts were against the weight of the evidence. Id. at 28, 497 A.2d
at 625-26.
lenge that the trial judge in his charge to the jury had dismantled
their theory of religious belief as a defense.138 The court affirmed the
sentence for involuntary manslaughter 9 but vacated the sentences
for endangering the welfare of children,140 holding that it merged
into the manslaughter conviction.14 1 Consequently, the Superior
Court became the first appellate court in the United States to affirm
an involuntary manslaughter conviction of a parent under these
circumstances.
The court in Barnhart was clearly justified in reaching its con-
clusion that imposing criminal liability in these situations does not
violate the free exercise clause. The state's interest in protecting the
lives of children clearly outweighs any possible religious claim of a
parent.14 2 Nonetheless, although imposing criminal liability is consti-
tutionally proper, there appears to be an overall judicial reluctance
to impose liability in these situations.
This reluctance is understandable in view of the fact that these
cases do not deal with parents who willfully neglect their child be-
cause these parents do not care about the child. In these situations,
criminal liability is imposed on parents who have done everything
that they believe can possibly be done to help the child. The parents
in Barnhart believed that they were acting in the best interest of
their child because they believed that the child's spiritual interest
was more important than the child's physical well-being."'
An indication of the judicial reluctance of imposing liability in
these situations is shown not only in the numerous decisions revers-
ing convictions on procedural grounds,4 4 but also in the sentences
imposed when a parent has been convicted. The sentences are often
moderate, as illustrated by the sentence imposed by the trial court in
the Barnhart decision. "4 5 Furthermore, the Superior Court opinion
affirming the Barnharts' convictions is written in what could argua-
bly be considered an apologetic tone.' 6
138. See supra notes 126 and accompanying text.
139. See supra note 127.
140. Id.
141. The court was of the opinion that imposing dual sentences under the circumstances
would be a violation of the constitutional bar against double jeopardy. 345 Pa. Super. at 35,
497 A.2d at 629. See Blockburger v. United States, 284 U.S. 299, 304 (1932) (when the same
act or transaction constitutes a violation of two distinct statutory provisions, the test to be
applied to determine whether there are two offenses or only one is whether each provision
requires proof of a fact that the other does not). The court gave the Blockburger test a
mechanical application and concluded that the convictions for endangering the welfare of chil-
dren merged with the involuntary manslaughter convictions for purposes of sentencing. 345 Pa.
Super. at 36, 497 A.2d at 629-30.
142. See supra notes 20-23 and accompanying text.
143. See supra note 122.
144. See supra notes 88, 91, 100 and accompanying text.
145. See supra note 127. See also supra note 86.
146. See supra note 129 and accompanying text.
The undesirable position the Superior Court experienced in the
Barnhart decision was inevitable considering the rights involved.
147
As long as religious organizations which have as a central tenet a
belief in spiritual healing continue to exist and be recognized by law,
there are bound to be similar conflicts which will arise in the future.
The court in Barnhart was forced to reach the conclusion it did
under the law as it presently exists in the United States and more
importantly in Pennsylvania.
VI. Suggested Alternative to Imposing Criminal Liability
A. Reasons for Considering Alternative
The Commonwealth of Pennsylvania recognizes and acquiesces
in the spiritual healing practices of legitimate religious organizations
in the State to a certain degree. 14 8 For example, in adoption proceed-
ings, adopting parents are to be of the same religious faith as the
natural parents of the adoptee whenever possible. No person shall be
denied this benefit because of a religious belief in the use of spiritual
means or prayer for healing. 149 Additionally, the Pennsylvania
School Health Services Law,150 which requires medical and dental
examinations for school children, 151 provides an exemption from such
examinations for children whose parents object on religious grounds
so long as the Secretary of Health does not find that the health of
other persons will be endangered by allowing the exemption.152
Other examples are present in the Pennsylvania Disease Preven-
tion and Control Law of 1955.158 A person who has contracted a
communicable disease, may, with permission from the state or local
Department of Health, be treated by a duly accredited practitioner
of a well-recognized spiritual healing organization, provided that all
sanitation, isolation, or quarantine requirements are satisfied.154 A
couple may obtain a marriage license without submitting to the
usual premarital examination for syphilis if they can demonstrate
that the examinations are contrary to their religious creed and that
the public welfare would not thereby be injured. 155 The Professional
147. 345 Pa. Super. at 21, 497 A.2d at 622.
148. See Trescher and O'Neill, Jr., Medical Care for Dependent Children: Manslaugh-
ter Liability of the Christian Scientist, 109 U. PA. L. REV. 203 (1960) (suggesting that by
judicial and legislative acceptance of Christian Science practices, criminal liability may not be
imposed where spiritual healing is unsuccessful).
149. 23 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 2725 (Purdon Supp. 1985).
150. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 24, §§ 14-1401-1422 (Purdon 1962 & Supp. 1985).
151. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 24, §§ 14-1402, 1403 (Purdon Supp. 1985).
152. PA. STAT. ANi. tit. 24, §§ 14-1419 (Purdon 1962).
153. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 35, §§ 521.1-521.21 (Purdon 1977).
154. Id. § 521.11(a.3).
155. Id. § 521.12(e).
Nursing Law" 6 does not prohibit the care of the sick, with or with-
out compensation for personal profits, when done in connection with
the practice of the religious tenets of any church or by adherants
thereby. 1
7
Basically, Pennsylvania is conveying to the adherants of recog-
nized spiritual healing organizations that their practices are legal so
long as the public welfare and the lives of children are not endan-
gered. More specifically, the message is that parents who are mem-
bers of these faiths may treat their children according to spiritual
healing practices so long as the children's lives are not endan-
gered." If the state becomes aware of an endangered child, it will
intervene and order the medical care that is necessary to save the life
of the child.159 If the state does not become aware of the dangerous
situation and the spiritual healing practices are unsuccessful, and re-
sult in a child's death, however, the parents' act is viewed as
criminal.160
State intervention into parental autonomy for the purpose of or-
dering medical care for a child whose life is endangered is reasona-
ble and necessary, and it serves a legitimate purpose."' Parents
should not be allowed to make martyrs of their children."' Society
benefits from state intervention in these situations in that children
are protected. When the child has passed away, the question arises:
What does society gain by punishing the parents after the fact? This
question seems to have no legitimate answer.
Initially, it should be pointed out that the state's interest in pro-
tecting the interest of the child evaporates with the death of the
child. There is no resurrection of the child upon the punishment of
the parent. The court in Barnhart bottomed its decision on Justin
Barnhart's inability to express his voice in his parent's decision to
forego medical treatment on his behalf." But punishing the parents
after the fact did not give Justin Barnhart a voice in the decision.
An argument might be made that the state has an interest in
preventing other parents who are members of spiritual healing orga-
nizations from engaging in similar conduct in the future. By punish-
ing the Barnharts, other parents might be deterred from engaging in
similar conduct. The viability of this argument, however, is doubtful.
156. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 63, §§ 211-225 (Purdon 1968 & Supp. 1985).
157. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 63, § 214(2) (Purdon Supp. 1985).
158. See supra notes 115-16 and accompanying text.
159. Id. See also supra notes 63-68 and accompanying text.
160. See supra note 136 and accompanying text. See also supra notes 78-86 and accom-
panying text.
161. See supra notes 63-68 and accompanying text.
162. Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158, 170 (1944).
163. See supra note 136 and accompanying text.
If one considers that some parents are willing to sacrifice their child
in the practice of their religion, it is doubtful that the threat of crim-
inal prosecution will have any deterrent effect. It is difficult to con-
ceptualize a penalty that the government could impose which would
deter more than the threat of losing a child. In any event, judicial
recognition of the harshness of imposing criminal liability has re-
sulted in the imposition of moderate sentences, '" thus adding
strength to the argument that in the future parents in similar situa-
tions are unlikely to be deterred by the threat of criminal
prosecution.
Furthermore, the character of the conduct considered criminal
in these situations is unique in that it is not likely to continue to
endanger the public welfare. In the decisions in Reynolds v. United
States1"6 and Prince v. Massachusetts,6" criminal liability was im-
posed in order to prevent ongoing harm to the public welfare. In
Reynolds, the crime of bigamy was involved. The state had a legiti-
mate interest in preventing ongoing harm to the concept of family
life, an important interest in our society. By imposing criminal sanc-
tions on George Reynolds, the state was protecting that interest. In
Prince, the state imposed criminal liability on Mrs. Prince to prevent
her from continuing to violate the child labor laws and thereby fur-
ther endangering the welfare of the child involved. In the situation
presented in Barnhart, however, there is no further harm to be pre-
vented, or any likelihood that the conduct which has caused the
harm will continue.
In the Barnhart situation, the only legitimate justification for
punishment is that society in general has an inherent desire to see
that those who do wrong are adequately punished. One could argue
that society in general benefits from knowing that parents who fail to
provide their children with medical aid because of their religious be-
liefs are adequately punished. The argument follows essentially the
eye-for-an-eye rationale. This theory of imposing criminal punish-
ment, however, does not take into account the substantial number of
individuals in Pennsylvania that are both members of society in gen-
eral and members of spiritual healing organizations. These people
are substantial enough in number to have gained recognition by the
Pennsylvania Legislature in various provisions of Pennsylvania
law. 1 7 In light of this recognition, perhaps Pennsylvania should con-
sider exempting this type of conduct from criminal liability. Pennsyl-
vania should emphasize protecting children before the harm occurs,
164. See supra notes 86, 127.
165. 98 U.S. 145 (1878). See supra notes 9-13 and accompanying text.
166. 321 U.S. 158 (1944). See supra notes 20-23 and accompanying text.
167. See supra notes 149-157 and accompanying text.
not punishing parents after the fact.'6 8 Many other states have real-
ized the impropriety of imposing criminal liability in these situations
and have acted to remedy the situation by providing spiritual healing
exemptions in their child neglect laws. 16 9
The practicality of a spiritual healing exemption is exemplified
by a recent decision in Oklahoma. 7 0 A child died of peritonitis after
his parents chose not to seek medical care for the child, relying in-
stead on the power of prayer. The parents were charged with first
degree manslaughter17 1 for failing to provide medical attention and
thereby directly causing the child's death. After the trial court ac-
quitted the parents, the state appealed, objecting to the following
instruction by the trial judge:
A person is justified under the law of this state in not pro-
viding medical treatment for his child if instead that parent in
good faith, selects and depends upon spiritual means alone
through prayer, in accordance with the tenets and practice of a
recognized church or religious denomination for the treatment
or cure of disease of such child.'17
The Oklahoma Court of Criminal Appeals affirmed the acquittal,
concluding that the instruction was proper in light of the spiritual
healing exemption in effect at the time of the child's death. 78
Equipped with the spiritual healing exemption, the court was able to
avoid the undesirable position it was placed in some seventy-two
years earlier in Owens v. State.'
74
A possible difficulty with enacting a spiritual healing exemption
168. In the reporting phase of the Child Protective Services Law, 11 PA. CONS. STAT.
ANN. §§ 2201-2224 (Purdon Supp. 1985), those who ordinarily have a duty to report cases of
child abuse are relieved of this duty when the child is "in good faith being furnished treatment
by spiritual means through prayer alone in accordance with the tenets and practices of a rec-
ognized church or religious denomination by a duly accredited practitioner thereof or is not
provided specific medical treatment in the practice of religious beliefs. ... Id. § 2203. See
also Commonwealth v. Barnhart, 345 Pa. Super. 10, 33, 497 A.2d 616, 628 (1985).
If anything, Pennsylvania would seem to have its exemption in the wrong place. This
above exemption could possibly discourage a person from reporting a situation where a child is
in need of medical care. We need to encourage reporting to save the child's life, not punishing
the parents after the fact.
169. See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 11, § 1104 (1979); D.C. CODE ANN. § 16-2301(9)(E)
(1981); GA. CODE ANN. § 24A-401(8) (Harrison Supp. 1985); IND. CODE ANN. § 35-46-1-5
(Burns 1985); Mo. ANN. STAT. § 211.031.1(a) (Vernon Supp. 1986); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. §
2151.03(E) (Baldwin 1985); OR. REV. STAT. § 419.500 (1983), S.D. CODIFIED LAWS ANN. §
26-8-6 (1984). See also supra notes 100-01.
170. State v. Lockhart, 664 P.2d 1059 (Okla. Crim. App. 1983).
171. In order to convict the defendants for first degree manslaughter, the state had to
demonstrate that the defendants had committed an unlawful act. The state attempted to prove
this by showing that the parents had endangered their child. Id. at 1060.
172. Id. at 1059-60.
173. Id. The exemption in effect at the time was similar to Oklahoma's current exemp-
tion. See supra note 102. Because the state could not prove the underlying misdemeanor, the
charge of manslaughter in the first degree could not stand. Id.
174. 6 Okla. Crim. 110, 116 P. 345 (1911). See supra note 85 and accompanying text.
is that there may be a question of whether such an exemption would
violate the establishment clause of the first amendment to the Con-
stitution. 175 Although one court determined that a spiritual healing
exemption violated the establishment clause, that decision was over-
ruled on appeal. 17' No other court has made any such finding. This
is not surprising in light of the United States Supreme Court deci-
sion in Wisconsin. v. Yoder.
177
In Yoder, the court determined that exempting Amish parents
from criminal penalties for violations of Wisconsin's compulsory
school attendance law did not violate the establishment clause. The
Court stated that the three main concerns against which the estab-
lishment clause sought to protect were "sponsorship, financial sup-
port, and active involvement of the sovereign in religious activity."1 78
The Court then concluded that accommodating the religious beliefs
of the Amish could hardly be characterized as sponsorship or active
involvement. The court summarized: "Such an accommodation 're-
flects nothing more than the governmental obligation of neutrality in
the face of religious differences, and does not represent that involve-
ment of religious with secular institutions which it is the object of
the Establishment Clause to forestall.' "179 Likewise, it would appear
that exempting members of spiritual healing organizations in the
Barnhart situation could hardly be characterized as "sponsorship" or
"active involvement." Additionally, in view of the exemptions that
are provided for members of spiritual healing organizations in the
School Health Services Law 80 and the Pennsylvania Disease Preven-
tion and Control Law,1 81 it is doubtful that an exemption from crim-
inal liability would present any serious establishment clause
problems.
B. Suggested Spiritual Healing Exemption
The following is a proposed spiritual healing exemption which
could be added to the Child Welfare Statute:
175. "Congress shall make no law respecting the establishment of religion . US.
CoNsT. amend. I.
176. People v. Lybarger, 700 P.2d 910 (Colo. 1985). The trial court made the determi-
nation on its own motion. The Colorado Supreme Court overruled, concluding that the trial
court had committed reversible error in that neither of the parties to the action had raised the
issue. The court did not decide whether the exemption violated the establishment clause be-
cause this decision was unnecessary for disposal of the case. Id. at 915.
177. 406 U.S. 205 (1972). See supra notes 30-42 and accompanying text.
178. Id. at 234 n.22 (citation omitted).
179. Id. at 235 n.22 (quoting Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398, 409 (1963)). See supra
notes 24-29 and accompanying text.
180. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 24, J§ 14-1401-1422 (Purdon 1962 & Supp. 1985). See supra
note 152 and accompanying text.
181. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 35, § 521.1-521.21 (Purdon 1977). See notes 154-55 and ac-
companying text.
In any prosecution for endangering the welfare of a child,
pursuant to section 4304, based upon an alleged failure or re-
fusal to provide proper medical care or treatment to an ill child,
it is an affirmative defense that the defendant (1) is the parent
or legal guardian of such child; and (2) is a member or adherant
of an organized church or religious group the tenets of which
prescribe prayer as the principle treatment for illness; and (3) in
good faith treated or caused to be treated such ill child in accor-
dance with such tenets.
Nothing contained herein shall prevent a court from order-
ing medical care where a child's life is endangered or where
there is a threat of harm to the public welfare.
C. General Observations Concerning the Suggested Amendment
(1) The exemption will apply only where parents or guardians
have chosen not to provide a child with medical care. Thus, the ex-
emption will necessarily have limited application.
(2) The requirement that the parent has to treat the child in
good faith according to the tenets of a spiritual healing group or
organization will minimize the possibility of spurious claims, which
might otherwise arise under such an exemption. For example, a situ-
ation where a parent joined such an organizations six months prior
to a child's death would raise a presumption that the exemption
would not apply.
(3) Whether a particular group is an organized church or reli-
gious group would be left to judicial discretion, to be determined
after a consideration of a variety of factors, such as the size of the
group, or whether the group has been chartered by the state.
(4) The exemption would not be available to individuals claim-
ing "philosophy of life" beliefs, as the exemption is limited to mem-
bers of religious organizations.
(5) Although applying the exemption may involve difficult cases
of judicial line-drawing in determining whether a belief is a religious
belief or whether a group is a religious group, the benefits that will
result in clear cases outweigh the difficulties which may be encoun-
tered in close cases.
(6) The key point provided in the exemption is that it will not
prevent a court from ordering medical care if the state has received
notice of an endangered child.
VII. Conclusion
The decisions of the United States Supreme Court and of the
various state courts clearly indicate that there is no constitutional
impediment to imposing criminal liability on a parent when the par-
ent has caused the death of a child by failing to provide the child
with medical care based on religious beliefs. It is not so clear, how-
ever, that imposing criminal liability is desirable in view of the judi-
cial reluctance to impose criminal liability in these situations and the
number of states that have enacted spiritual healing exemptions. Be-
cause of the unique nature of the conduct involved in these situa-
tions, it is doubtful whether society benefits by punishing parents in
these situations. For this reason, Pennsylvania should consider enact-
ing the proposed spiritual healing exemption which will alleviate the
unfairness inherent in punishing parents such as the Barnharts.
Daniel J. Kearney
